Face of Truth | Ibrahim Shaglawi Promediation and Political Ambiguity?
Face of Truth | Ibrahim Shaglawi Promediation and Political Ambiguity?

Face of Truth | Ibrahim Shaglawi
Promediation and Political Ambiguity?
As the Sudanese war nears its conclusion and the political scene becomes increasingly complex, the European organization “Promediation” has extended an invitation to Sudanese Islamists of various affiliations to participate in a political dialogue in Doha from April 11 to 13. Although the invitation is shrouded in ambiguity, it quickly turned into a testing ground for the positions of Islamists, who continue to experience internal divisions since the fall of the al-Bashir regime in 2019. Between the objectivity of motives and differing responses within the National Congress Party, fundamental questions emerge regarding the timing and implications of this path, which we aim to explore in this article.
Notably, the invitation coincided with the increasing field role of the Sudanese army in countering attacks by the Rapid Support Forces militia, amid direct accusations against countries like the UAE for providing logistical and political support to this aggression, raising questions about the timing of the initiative. In this context, organizing a political dialogue abroad while the country is waging an existential battle can be interpreted as a distraction from national efforts, if not an attempt to redraw the scene on foreign terms.
At the heart of this dynamic came a firm rejection from the leadership of the National Congress Party – represented by Ahmed Haroun – to participate in the Doha consultations. The rejection was not emotional but based on several political and strategic considerations, the most prominent of which is that while dialogue is necessary, it must be built on purely national foundations and held within Sudan, after the war ends and full national sovereignty is restored. The party views any dialogue before the end of the current battle as implicit recognition of a de facto legitimacy created by the militia and its foreign backers.
Conversely, another current of Islamists – led by Ibrahim Mahmoud – accepted the invitation and named representatives to participate, reflecting a tactical rather than ideological division, as both parties share the same Islamic reference but differ in their assessment of the priorities of the stage. This division brings to mind the Syrian experience, where Islamists were gradually co-opted within international arrangements after being sidelined at the beginning of the revolution. Is the international community seeking to replicate this model in Sudan?
The language of the National Congress Party’s statement was coherent and professional, balancing gratitude to Qatar as a host country with a refusal to participate for objective reasons related to timing, location, and substance. The statement emphasized that the invitation, in its format that reduced the parties to “Islamists,” contributes to deepening polarization and frames religion as a factor for political sorting in a country rich in religious and cultural diversity. The party asserts that dialogue should be national and inclusive, based on citizenship rather than ideology.
More importantly, the party had previously presented its vision for Sudan’s future through the “Agenda for the Future,” which calls for a Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue after the war, reflecting a principled rather than circumstantial position on the issue of dialogue. Hence, its rejection of the invitation can be understood as a continuation of a methodology that rejects any foreign intervention in shaping post-war arrangements.
Overall, the “Promediation” invitation represents an attempt to test the Islamic current’s willingness to engage in a new political engineering in Sudan. Though seemingly a step toward peace, it in fact reflects an effort to reposition international powers in Sudan under the cover of dialogue.
On another front, the “Promediation” organization, active in Africa for years, is seen by some Sudanese analysts as working to establish a foothold for European powers – particularly France – in post-war files through the gateway of political dialogue. This leads some voices to consider the organization an open book with clear objectives, whose background the Sudanese do not ignore.
Promediation is a French organization active in mediation and civil dialogue in conflict zones. It has shown notable interest in Sudanese affairs, especially after the outbreak of war in April 2023. The organization has hosted several initiatives, workshops, and political forums aimed at bringing Sudanese disputing parties to the dialogue table.
In April 2024, the organization, in cooperation with the Swiss Foreign Ministry, sponsored a workshop in Geneva that discussed ways to achieve a ceasefire and transition to civilian rule. In January of the same year, it organized another workshop in Cairo that brought together Darfur movements under French-Egyptian sponsorship to explore opportunities for de-escalation in the region. This ongoing activity reflects the organization’s aspiration to play the role of a neutral mediator – or perhaps one aligned with the “Taqaddum” Civil Forces Coordination – given the complexities of the Sudanese political scene.
Promediation’s invitation to Sudanese Islamists for the Doha dialogue at this critical time, as we see it from the #Face_of_Truth, does not appear innocent or disconnected from the international context of redrawing political maps in post-war countries. When the inviting body is a “soft arm” of Western influence, the summoning of Islamists to the table cannot be read as a spontaneous openness but rather as a calculated step to test responses and shape alternatives. Is this merely a listening session? Or the beginning of conditional integration in the Syrian fashion? The more pressing question remains: Why now? And in whose interest is the deck being reshuffled?
Wishing you well and in good health.
Sunday, April 6, 2025
Shglawi55@gmail.com





